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ماهیت رفتار سیاسی روسیه در منطقه آسیای مرکزی و چال شهای فراروی جمهوری اسلامی ایران | ||
| پژوهشهای جغرافیای انسانی | ||
| مقاله 5، دوره 42، شماره 2 - شماره پیاپی 72، مرداد 1389، صفحه 63-82 اصل مقاله (240.33 K) | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| زهرا پیشگاهی فرد1؛ رضا جنیدی2 | ||
| 1دانشیار دانشکده جغرافیا، دانشگاه تهران | ||
| 2دانشجوی کارشناسی جغرافیای سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران | ||
| چکیده | ||
| از نظر راهبران روسیه، حوزه نفوذ سنتی اتحاد جماهیر شوروی به ویژه آسیای مرکزی و قفقاز نخستین سنگر پدافندی برای پاسداری از امنیت ملی روسیه است و رفتار مسکو بر سیاق دوران روسی ه تزاری و شوروی سابق، باید به دنبال اعمال سلطه بر این منطقه باشد . با وجود این، روسیه در طول دو دهه اخیر، رویکردهای مختلفی در قبال آسیای مرکزی در پیش گرفته که در نگاه اول ممکن است تداعی کننده سردرگمی سران کاخ کرملین باشد؛ اما با بررسی دقیق علت اتخاذ چنین رو یه ای، می توان دریافت که این رویکردها صرفاً تاکتیکی، و ب همنظور تحقق راهبرد کلان روسیه در آسیای مرکزی بوده اند. آنچه که برای جمهوری اسلامی ایران اهمیت دارد، این است که روسیه در روند تحقق راهبرد و اعمال سلطه بلامنازع خود بر آسیای مرکزی، از چه منظرهایی نفوذ کشور ما را در این منطقه با محدودیت ر و به رو می سازد. استدلال مقاله حاضر بر این است که علایق ژئوپلیتیکی ایران و روسیه در این منطقه در بسیاری از زمینه ها از جمله رژیم حقوقی دریای خزر، ترانزیت انرژی و رقابت های اقتصادی به طور طبیعی در تعارض با یکدیگر قرار دارد؛ چرا که اساساً هر اندازه نفوذ سیاسی اقتصادی و فرهنگی ایران در این منطقه افزایش یابد، به طور طبیعی از دامنه فرصت های روسیه برای بهره برداری از موقعیت جغرافیایی خود کاسته خواهد شد. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| آسیای مرکزی؛ ایران.؛ چالش ژئوپلیتیکی؛ رفتار سیاسی؛ روسیه | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| The Nature of Russia’s Political Behavior in the Central Asian Region and the Challenges for the Islamic Republic of Iran | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| zahra pishgahi fard1؛ R. Joneidi2 | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| Extended Abstract Introduction The political behavior of Russia in the Central Asian region, since its collapse has experienced four different periods: 1. 1991-1993, during which, for some reasons, the Russians did not pay any special attention to this region; 2. 1993-2001, with the growth of radical fundamentalism and the beginning of the New Great Game, the Russians’ attention was drawn to this region; 3. 2001-2005, after September 11, Putin started new relationships with NATO, while agreeing with the presence of US troops and European companies’ investments in the region; 4. 2005-2009, the nature of Russia’s behavior turned out to be based on energy imperialism for punishing revolutionaries and disloyal states, reviving the old empire, and challenging the West in a new world competition; The present paper studies the reasons for Russia’s paradoxical behaviors in Central Asia and the consequent geopolitical challenges for Iran’s national interests. Methodology Some scholars believe that Russia’s behavior towards Central Asia changes according to Russian authorities’ approaches – Atlantic’s, Slav cists and Eurasian’s. Although the authorities’ role in determining foreign policy pattern is not deniable, according to Kenneth N. Waltz’s systemic theory “understanding international politics is not possible by merely looking into the governments”. The writers argue that the theory of Structural Realism can be useful for analyzing the nature of Russia’s behavior in this region. James Doherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff believe that the main elements of realism are power, national interests, and fight for power in international fronts. Results and discussion The implications for each period are as follows: A. 1) Russia’s chaotic economic condition and the necessity to improve it through intermingling with international economy; 2) the dominance of Atlantic approach; 3) lack of attention to this region from other world-powers; B. 1) the necessity to control radical fundamentalism; 2) the necessity to prevent Uranium and drugs trafficking; 3) protecting the rights of the Russians remaining in Central Asia; 4) guaranteeing the survival of CIS for safeguarding Russian interests in the future (Shiazi, 1997: 193); 5) discovering new oil and gas reserves and beginning the New Great Game; 6) the necessity of more dynamism to keep up with the competitors in the New Great Game. C. 1) Central Asian states’ developing intended to undermine Russian geopolitical dominance as a result of Moscow’s strict behavior in the 90s; 2) stopping the continuity of the states’ unstable economic condition with the help of the West and the subsequent decrease in fundamentalist activities; 3) drawing the advantages of cooperation with the West, especially the permission to confront the separatists, like in Chechnya, and improving the chaotic Russian economy, especially through membership in WTO and the Group of Eight (G8); 4) establishing its transit conditions through cooperation with the US; 5) understanding Russia’s superior geographical-political situation, especially its energy power; 6) the ability to function as a rein to control this region’s countries in superregional factors; 7) confronting the influence of regional powers, especially China. It seems that in Russian authorities’ view these goals would not be attained but through tactical cooperation with the West. D. 1) the US attempts in the last two decades to disintegrate Russian political and economic power; 2) The West attempts to change Central Asian leaders’ attitudes through supporting Russia by means of Colorful revolutions, and the increase of Russian historic cynicism with the Americans; 3) the improvement of Russia’s economic conditions (Mathieu, 2009: 2) and its ability to revive Russian empire through economic means and even using hard force against rebelling states like Georgia. Cogen says that historians consider August, 8, 2008 as a historic turning point, no less than the fall of Berlin Wall, November, 9, 1989: “In fact, Russia’s attack against the independent Georgian territory formally signals the return of history to 19th century Great Game.” Hence, taking into consideration the changing international situations and its means of force (soft, hard, and smart), Russia has managed to exert and establish its geopolitical dominance on Central Asia. In other words, Russia uses hard force (economic punishments, blocking transit routes, and even military attack) against regional rebelling states, soft force (appeals and motivations made possible by economic and security supports) against obedient states, and energy policies against the influence of superregional powers, especially the EU – what Tsygankov calls “energy imperialism”. Although Russia has, in some cases and for some geopolitical implications, tactically accepted the Western presence and influence in Central Asia, the nature of Moscow’s behavior in the region – i.e. total dominance – is always stable and the same. Iran, with its unique geography, is one of the most important potential competitors of Russia in the region. Geopolitical logic urges Russia to restrict Iran’s influence on the region, as it does with other influential powers. Because the more Iran’s influence on the region increases, the more Russian geographical and political appeals, especially in energy transit and economic competition in Central Asian market decreases. Moreover, in its attack to Georgia, Russia showed that in addition to soft force, it will also use hard force if necessary. Based on such attitudes, Russia, ignoring Iran’s views, emphasizes the joint nature of Caspian surface and the division of its water, in order to exploit sea resources and, in emergency cases, conducts maneuvers and exerts psychological influences on the neighboring countries for gaining more advantage. However, due to some tactical implications, especially reining the unilateral behaviors of the US, the geopolitical challenges between Iran and Russia in Central Asia, have Human Geography Research Quarterly, No. 72, Summer 2010 11 not been revealed and focused on and will probably be taken to the political stage sometime in the future. Conclusion This article presents that Iranian and Russian geopolitical interests in the region are naturally contradictory in several ways: the Legal Regime of the Caspian Sea, energy transit, and economic rivalry. This is because the more Iran’s politico-economic and cultural influence on the region increases, naturally the more Russian opportunities for using its geographical position decreases. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| Central Asia, Geopolitical challenge, Iran., political behavior, Russia | ||
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