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بیش اطمینانی مدیریت و حق الزحمۀ حسابرسی | ||
| بررسیهای حسابداری و حسابرسی | ||
| مقاله 6، دوره 22، شماره 3، 1394، صفحه 363-384 اصل مقاله (338.81 K) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22059/acctgrev.2015.55660 | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| یحیی حساس یگانه1؛ مسعود حسنی القار* 2؛ محمد مرفوع3 | ||
| 1دانشیار گروه حسابداری، دانشکدۀ مدیریت و حسابداری، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران، ایران | ||
| 2مربی گروه حسابداری، دانشکدۀ علوم انسانی، دانشگاه بزرگمهر قائنات، قائن، ایران | ||
| 3استادیار گروه حسابداری، دانشکدۀ مدیریت و حسابداری، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی، تهران، ایران | ||
| چکیده | ||
| بیشاطمینانی یا اعتماد بیش از حد به خود میتواند اعتقاد بیاساس دربارۀ تواناییهای شناختی، قضاوتها و استدلال شهودی فرد تعریف شود. بیشاطمینانی یکی از مهمترین ویژگیهای شخصیتی مدیران است که بر ریسکپذیری تأثیر میگذارد. چنانچه حسابرس این ویژگی شخصیتی مدیران را تشخیص دهد و ریسک گزارشگری مالی را بهدلیل بیشاطمینانی مدیران، بیش از حد برآورد کند، میتواند حقالزحمة بیشتری مطالبه کند و اقدامهایش را بهمنظور کاهش ریسک عدم کشف کامل کند. از سوی دیگر، چون مدیران بیشاطمینان به فرایند گزارشگری مالی شرکت اطمینان دارند، تلاش میکنند از طریق مذاکره، دامنة رسیدگی‌های حسابرسی را کم کنند و حقالزحمة کمتری پرداخت کنند. هدف پژوهش حاضر بررسی تأثیر بیشاطمینانی مدیریت بر حقالزحمة حسابرسی است. جامعة آماری پژوهش را شرکتهای پذیرفتهشده در بورس اوراق بهادار تهران طی سالهای 1386 تا 1392 تشکیل میدهد. در این پژوهش برای اندازهگیری بیشاطمینانی مدیریت از دو سنجة مبتنی بر تصمیمهای سرمایهگذاری استفاده شده است. نتایج پژوهش نشان میدهد بین بیشاطمینانی مدیریت و حقالزحمة حسابرسی ارتباط منفی معناداری برقرار است. بر اساس بررسیهای بیشتر، بیشاطمینانی مدیریت بر استفاده از حسابرس متخصص صنعت، تأثیر معناداری ندارد. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| بیشاطمینانی مدیریت؛ حسابرس متخصص صنعت؛ حقالزحمة حسابرسی؛ ریسک حسابرسی و گزارشگری مالی | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Managerial overconfidence and audit fees | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Yahya Hasas Yeganeh1؛ Masoud Hasani Alghar2؛ Mohammad Marfou3 | ||
| 1Associate Professor of Accounting, Faculty of Accounting and Management, Allame Tabatabaei University, Tehran, Iran | ||
| 2Instructor of Accounting, Faculty of Humanities, Bozorgmehr University of Qaenat, Qaen, Iran | ||
| 3Assistant Professor of Accounting, Faculty of Accounting and Management, Allame Tabatabaei University, Tehran, Iran | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| Overconfidence or excessive self-confidence in general can be defined as a groundless belief about individual’s cognitive abilities, judgments and intuitive reasoning. If the auditor recognizes these personality traits in managers and estimates the financial reporting risk to be excessive due to managerial overconfidence, he/she could demand higher audit fees to compensate for the additional audit efforts needed to reduce detection risk. On the other hand, due to the confidence in their firms’ financial reporting process, the overconfident managers choose negotiation as a way to demand less scope and pay lower fees to the auditors. This study aimed to investigate the effect of managerial overconfidence on audit fees. The statistical population consisted of firms listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange during the years 2007 to 2013. The results indicated a significant negative relation between managerial overconfidence and audit fees. The additional studies showed that managerial overconfidence has no significant impact on using industry specialist auditors. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| Audit fees, audit risk, financial reporting and managerial overconfidence, industry specialist auditor | ||
| مراجع | ||
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