

## The Role of Identity-Semantic Ideals of Executive Elites in Iran's Foreign Policy (1368-1376)

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**DOR: 20.1001.1.26767368.2021.3.8.6.8**

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(Received: 23 September 2020 - Accepted: 30 May 2021)

### Abstract

Researchers use various political science and international relations theories with modifications to analyze Hashemi's foreign policy in the period 1368-1376. Most writers believe Hashemi's foreign policy was realistic according to materialist and rationalist theories, and the power-ideology equation changed in favor of power during this period. Others, using liberal-capitalist approaches, argue that Hashemi's government tended to converge with international economic and financial institutions and organizations. However, the above research vacuum is ignoring the government and society identity components in this period and its impact on foreign policy. The identity of political actors has a decisive effect on their behavior in the international arena; therefore, the identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been an influential factor in the foreign policy of this country. With the descriptive-analytical method, the present study aimed to examine the effect of identity ideals on Hashemi's foreign policy. The hypothesis of this research is: Hashemi's policy-making and foreign policy orientation are influenced by the identity components of the domestic executive political elites and the dominance of the Westernist identity discourse over the international system after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

**Keywords:** Identity, Hashemi, Iran Foreign Policy, International System, Constructivism.

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### Introduction

The analysis of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in different periods (from 1357 until now) is impossible entirely in the framework of a political theory. Therefore, researchers and scholars use a specific approach or a combination of different ideas for each period. For analyzing Hashemi's foreign policy, we need to use this point. Nevertheless, most scholars have used the realistic theory to analyze Hashemi's foreign policy. The present study aimed to examine the Western orientation of Hashemi policy-making in the domestic and foreign arenas with an emphasis on the constructivist approach.

The countries foreign policy is developed according to the concept of identity, self-knowledge, and others. Identity as a tool in strategic interaction between countries determines the role of government. Determining the position, status, prestige, behavior style, and countries' function in the international system is determined by their cultural and civilizational level in the world. A country that does not define "Self" and "Other" becomes passive and confused in defining and determining national interest, policy-making, and foreign policy orientation. Finally, it has ambiguities and difficulties in deciding commonalities and differences with other political units and cannot form alliances with world powers. "Self" and "Making-other" form the basis of the formation and incubation of the foreign policy orientation of countries. (Dehghani Firuzabadi, 1388).

After the Islamic Revolution victory and during the Iraq war against Iran, some political elites and thinkers of the society were engaged in developing an identity for the Iranian nation that relied on Islam and Islamic honors. Ancient Iran has not a place there. Some considered "Nation" as opposed to "Ummah" and "National Identity" as opposed to "Islamic Identity" (Mojtahedzadeh, 1385: 33).

After the end of the imposed war, Hashemi in foreign policy emphasized the components of pragmatism, westernism, internationalism, and in the domestic arena, specialization, revival of capitalism, and modernization. Hashemi did not limit himself to political activity in a particular political group and had a good reading and interpretation of political Islam. His supporters attributed support or opposition to Hashemi with support and resistance to the Prophet, and Hashemi rebuked his critics as "Nagger." Hashemi replaced the modern speech system with a dominant speech in the Imam era. In his arena, warriors had not a place. This arena was for specialized forces, university graduates, wealthy classes, manufacturing enterprises, etc. In Hashemi Rafsanjani's mental space, warriors were revered and sanctified, but most played the role of a proud heritage left by their predecessors. Even the way Hezbollah figures adornment has changed in the new scene, everything has moved towards a technocratic rule. In such circumstances, the warriors, who had spent a long time on the battlefield, suddenly found the world depicted during the war years a

lost world. Thus began the grounds for hatred and opposition to Mr. Hashemi and his speech and the represented world. In the previous speech challenge, Mr. Hashemi stood in front of the world of war speech next to the world of the rational discourse of development and progress (Kashi, 1379: 354).

During his presidency, Hashemi sought economic development and "Simulation" with the capitalist economy, "Integration," and "Convergence" in the international system. But, from Hashemi's belief, a product needs "Experts" and "Technocrats," so in this period, "Value," "Traditional," and "Committed" went to the "Margin" and were gradually "Rejected." And in the domestic arena, over time, they became Hashemi's "Rival" and "Other." Moreover, regarding Hashemi's pragmatic and authoritarian spirit, intolerance towards critical forces, "Intellectuals," "Left Political Forces," and "National-Religious Elites and Intellectuals" also became serious "Opponents" and "Critics" of Hashemi. Hashemi avoided creating "Others" and "Rivals" in the international arena by adopting a policy of "De-Escalation." However, in this period, the "Zionist Regime" was considered "Other."

### **1. Constructivism Approach**

According to Social Constructivism, ideas are the basis of everything. Thus, the material world alone is not enough to explain the function of the world, but abstract and semantic forces shape behavior, identity, and benefit. Regarding Constructivism, norms guide foreign policy (Kayser, 2015: 49).

From the Constructivists, ideas and identities are components of governments' behavior. In other words, societal ideas, interests, and institutions influence the behavior of governments and the formation of preferences and priorities that form the basis of social goals and the base of strategic calculations of governments (Minesashvili\_Kakachia, 2015: 172).

Alexander Wendt, the leading theorist of Constructivism, believes national identity consists of four layers: individual identities, distinctive identities (including cultural, religious, linguistic, and ethnic), role identities, and collective identities. He considers national identity as a combination of three layers of personal identity, role, and typical that creates a central meaning at the national level. First, personal identity refers to a person's position in the division of social work and their social role, which is often objective. Second, role identity refers to the mission and duty that a state considers for other states and nations. Then, specific identity refers to a kind of political unit, whether it is an empire, a nation-state, a sectarian, or in the state-nation-building stage or linguistic, civilizational, and cultural characteristics. Collective identity refers to the government's position with other actors, especially the main actors in international relations

(Wendt, 1999: 325). National identity is not a static phenomenon, but it is redefined in dealing with the established structure. And governments simultaneously reproduce their identities through their daily social actions. So identities are fluid, evolving, and dynamic categories. From the constructivists' approach, interests as an idea are intersubjective and interpretively epistemological (Folescu, 2009: 5). Finally, identity considers as the root or basis of political or social action in contrast to advantages (Baki, 2009: 4). Constructivism shapes the state's priorities and activities. Issues related to identity are at the center of Constructivism theory. From a constructivist perspective, identity is a part of the social environment and domestic and international politics (Wiener, 2007: 14).

We can explain government identity based on the "Concept of Personal Identity" model. Just as individuals differ in personality, values, interests, and characteristics, so do governments. Likewise, governments are different socially, historically, and so on. Each government focuses on the particular brand, creates a picture of it in their minds, and knows other governments. Thus, governments play a different role in the world. In addition, each government has a mission based on the unique nature of society, such as governments that emphasize their historical mission. Thus, the type of government is determined by the membership in existing social groups, interests, values, the kind of personality (Headley, 2007: 1-2).

Government or ruling elites have a role in foreign policy in the process of defining identity and interests. Elites play a decisive role in determining interests and identities in developing countries, especially in the Middle East. Therefore, there is a distinction between the functioning of elites in developed democratic political systems and developing authoritarian systems. In developed systems, elites often play a role in specific and accepted frameworks. Therefore, during the socialization process, they internalize different norms and act according to them. Thus, they simultaneously advance two socialization processes; on the one hand, they are influenced by domestic means.

On the other hand, there are international norms and constant interaction between these two levels. In developing countries, especially in the Middle East, elites often define means and incorporate them into political culture, becoming identity elements (Qahramanpour, 1383: 312-324).

According to the constructivists, construct identity formation through the interaction of structure and agent. Therefore, constructivists believe in the process of interaction between agents and systems. Consequently, they reciprocally build each other. The interaction between design and agent and the dialectical relationship between the two that constructivists accept raises the question of forming interests and identity. In this way, the government's

advantages are concluded from the interaction with the structures, and it has an internal relationship with it (Haji Yousefi, 1382: 50).

The relationship between national identity and foreign policy has not been considered for years due to the dominance of realism in international relations. However, with the emergence of the evolutionism approach in international relations and having importance to ideals, ideas, and immaterial elements, the identity component found its place in international relations. Identities shape actors' interests and actions, and understanding them is critical to analyzing actors' foreign policy and global behavior. Identity means a relatively fixed understanding based on empty roles and the expectations of others. Therefore, it is a relational matter (Moshirzadeh, 1383: 183).

Researchers divide Constructivism into three thought progress: systemic, unitary, and holistic. Systemic Constructivism emphasizes the role of immaterial, cultural structures, rules, norms, and intellectual structures at the international system level on governments and the formation of their identities and interests. That is, what determines the states' identity derives from their interaction with the global system. Different constructivists examine the unit level of the relationship between social and legal norms and values and domestic or national legal rules and their impact on the identity of states. The emphasis here is on the internal sources of the formation of the essence and interests of governments. According to the constructivists, understanding the states' foreign policy must understand what these norms are and rules are defined - for example, in their constitutional texts, standards within their social culture, norms and values in their political cultures, and even cultural means over foreign policy studies institutions and 'how do they influence foreign policy?' Finally, unite-level Constructivism tells us why governments behave differently, despite their existence in a single international environment. The third group is holistic constructivists.

It wants to connect these two views and know immaterial influencing factors (normative-cultural-value) on the governments and systems "Internationally and internally." (Moshirzadeh, 1384: 19-20). The theoretical framework of this paper is holistic Constructivism.

## **2. The Emergence of New Semantic Identity Ideals in Iranian Society in The 70s**

The stabilizer fundamental pillars of identity in Iranian society are based on Islamism, nationalism, and positioning towards the West. However, from 1368 to 1376, fundamental changes occurred at the domestic and international levels, which had primary identity-semantic effects on the executive elites of Iranian society. As a result, factors create the elites' identity components in Iran, such as a new reading of Islam, the strengthening of the nationalism component with

the fall of communism, and the supremacy of the cultural features of Western civilization. The following discussion reviews a specific reading of Islam, strengthening nationalism and westernism in the Hashemi period.

### **2.1. Expediency-Based Islamism in the Hashemi Period**

The Islamic world has always been the arena of Sunni and Shia religions. These two, throughout history, have had different theological, jurisprudential, political, and so argue. The main difference between the Sunni and Shia schools is the constant interaction of religion and state (caliphate) and prolonged governance experiences in this field. The Shia minority, unlike the Sunnis, unless a few times, has not had such an experience.

Some scholars believe that the existence of such an experience in the Sunni world has given their political and jurisprudential thought an "Efficientism" feature. So in the Sunni jurisprudential structure, categories such as the political order of society, security, and public interests have a special place. In contrast, less attention to Shia jurisprudence indicated the inverse situation of Shia in Islam history. According to the results, the Shia political experience, like Sunnis, and the status change from the relaxed, limited, and closed state of the clergy to the government, causes the entry of elements that are the requirements of state orientation into Shia jurisprudential thought.

According to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, dynamic jurisprudence is concerned with the reality and needs of society. "Correct jurisprudence is based on facts. People according to their needs extract them from the Quran and tradition and correct and firm documents" (Khamenei, 1372).

"Expediency" in Shia jurisprudence is not an independent source along with other sources, and it is an argument if there is a valid religious reason for its validity or the intellect rules it definitively. According to Shia principles, the expediency-thinking of the ruling Islamic state is about the material or national interests; but, the Islamic ruler is the Imam. Therefore, during the absence time, the comprehensive jurist governs. Based on material and spiritual goods that the holy shari'ah considers necessary to maintain, the conditions entrusted to him deal with expediency in various aspects of foreign relations. Therefore, the ruling expediency should be in the framework of general religious and intellectual criteria and according to the book's spirit and tradition. The Islamic State has responsibilities towards its people and all Muslims and the needy, and sometimes there are conflicts between these responsibilities. One crucial rule is the "Priority of More Important than Important;" recognizing and superiority the essential expediency on important expediency can protect the highest interests of Islam and Muslims (Arjini, 1387: 167).

The concept of "Expediency" was introduced during the Ayatollah Khomeini era. At that time, Imam thought more than anything about

the Islamic Republic's expediency. Therefore, he preferred preserving and continuing this system before all the religious obligations, including prayer and Hajj. Accordingly, issued an order to establish an "Expediency Discernment Council" to propose a way out of the impasse based on the interests of the system if the parliament and the Guardian Council disagree. The absorption and articulation of the modern expediency concept of the state could have made it possible to get out of any jurisprudential impasse and help the system in the stalemate of conflict with the sharia rules. "According to the Imam, this expediency-thinking is not unlawful but is a part of the legal authority of Islamic ruling, and the necessary consequence of the belief in reason and the acceptance of rational expediency for social issues by the ruling" (Tuyserkani, 1380: 139).

The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khamenei, in a meeting with the regime's agents on 9/11/1368, emphasized the three principles of "Dignity, Wisdom, and Taqiya" in foreign policy. In his view, dignity is "the movement of the Islamic society and system in any of its international confrontations should not lead to the humiliation of Islam and Muslims". Regarding the concept of wisdom, they also believed in maturity in affairs and securing national interests. "The Islamic system should work wisely and not move based on emotions and ignore vital interests and material advantages. The vision must be perfectly wise and mature". Finally, Taqiya in foreign policy is: "Taqiya is the shield of the believer. Where do they use the bumper? The bumper is used on the battlefield and during conflicts. So, Taqiya is in war; because it is an amulet, a trench, and a shield. Right now, global arrogance has power, and you have goals, and you want to do things. Therefore, there is no need for everyone to constantly announce from the tribunes and compete to do something and not do it later" (Khamenei, 1368).

Creating a balance between ideology and pragmatism in the formulation and implementation process of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic was one of the most complex and challenging issues of the system. Unfortunately, the construction cabinet could not resolve the conflict despite all efforts. Therefore, the place of general interests and the position of this factor in foreign policy ideology remained unclear. In addition, Hashemi Rafsanjani's pragmatism was strategically inconsistent with the ideal content and Ummah-based of the constitution. Prioritize economic development that followed the World Bank's policy to attract foreign investment, expand production, and increase employment and privatization (Azghandi, 1389: 90).

## **2.2. Nationalism**

At the beginning of the revolution's victory, "Islam" was a determining factor in developing Iran's foreign policy. However, gradually, with the passing of time and the occurrence of various events, including the long war and the failure to export the revolution,

the Islamic Republic was forced to reconsider its foreign policy's ideological rules and standards. Therefore, pragmatic considerations based on the survival needs of the regime prevailed. Hence, in parallel with the above developments, nationalist tendencies won over trans-National-Islamic directions (Hunter, 1380: 240).

The end of Imam Khomeini's era is the beginning of essential changes in the balance between the components and variables of pragmatism and ideology in the Iranian foreign policy in favor of activism. This very subtle and gradual change lasted eight years, and the theory of Islam began in one country. But, the intersection of three sets of events: domestic, regional, and global, together laid the foundation for a change in the national interests and foreign policy of the Islamic Republic (Ramezani, 1381: 13). In the Hashemi period, regardless of the closeness of Iran and Islam, the necessity of "National Dimension" in the foreign policy of "Islamic Iran" is explained as follow:

A) The division of political units is definite today, and "Monopoly" is impossible, at least in the current situation;

B) Attention to the land and sensitivity to the borders and their preservation is an obstacle to prevent the infiltrating of the imperialist and aggressor powers that have targeted independent governments and any Islamic government;

C) The Islamic Republic and any Islamic government need a secure land and base to establish the Islamic government and strengthen and perpetuate the revolution;

D) The framework of Islamic Iran itself is a pillar for forming the Islamic homeland of Islam; its strengthening and preservation as a prelude to creating a powerful Islamic world pole and constructing a "Single Nation" is necessary (Nakhaei, 1376: 299-300).

Thus, after the war, the identity based on nationalism, material values, conventionalism, and weak Westernism replaced the identity based on fundamentalism, semantics, and transcendental affairs due to developments inside and outside the country. During this period, technocrats returned semanticism and commitments, and Mr. Hashemi replaced the modern speech system with the dominant speech system in the Imam period. Warriors had no place in this field, but it was the specialized forces, university graduates, wealthy classes, manufacturing companies, and so on. In Hashemi Rafsanjani's thought, warriors were revered and sanctified but mostly played the role of early and glorious heritage (Kashi, 1379: 354).

### **2.3. Westernism**

After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the socialism identity-semantic components in the international community, the liberal Western discourse in many fields, especially in economics, culture, and politics, became the dominant global discourse at the first term of Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani. The capitalist economy and free-



market model by institutions and organizations are based on the teachings of economic liberalism emphasized by developing countries. During this period, the Hashemi government designed its financial programs in line with the international economy. With the end of the imposed war, Mr. Hashemi's government pursued an economic policy following the Western capitalist model. New policies increased the influence of pro-capitalist groups and fostered the spirit of private commercial profit. Development policy has upset social balance, increased inequality, changed values, and created various other issues.

Therefore, the central element of this discourse was growth and construction, utilitarianism, pragmatism in formulating and implementing policies with observing Islamic values at home and foreign policy. The necessity of transforming the war economy system into a free market and reconstruction system necessitated forming a "Construction" cabinet. On the other hand, the transition from the ideological cabinet to the technocratic cabinet imposed new insights on elites to interpreting and explaining political concepts. Debate on national interests was an essential concept. According to Ali Akbar Velayati, Iran's foreign minister in Hashemi's cabinet, "economic considerations overshadow political priorities" (Hosseinizadeh, 1386: 137).

In both governments, Hashemi Rafsanjani focused his efforts on rebuilding the country economically. Their economic policy during this period was based on economic liberalization, privatization, and the reduction of state monopolies in the economy. In this regard is used the eternal and foreign private sector and expanded free trade zones. At the same time, Iran entered the world economy that caused international organizations' involvement in domestic socio-political issues.

### **3. The Impact of Nationalism on the Hashemi Foreign Policy**

#### **3.1. Changing the National Role from a Savior Government to a Federal Government**

The dual identity of the Islamic Republic of Iran allows for different interpretations of the "Neither Eastern nor Western" principle. While the "Islamic Republic" expresses romantic ideals and loyalties inconsistent with the foundation of the current international system. The "Iran" component refers to geopolitical realities and a specific territorial unit and nation-state that impose boundaries and ideological internationalism restrictions. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic is the product of an all-out political revolution that its consequences have had a very significant impact on foreign policy. In the first years of the Islamic Revolution victory, like other revolutionary governments, the prevailing conditions allowed forming a radical and idealistic reading of "Neither Eastern nor Western" politics. At the same time, the post-war period required a pragmatic approach. In

other words, at the beginning of the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the "Islamic Republic" component was the pillar of shaping the central discourse of foreign policy. While in the years after the war, the "Iran" component became more decisive. In this period, the identities resulting from the revolution, or in other words, cultural-ideological identities, should have given way to organizational identity or identity resulting from the labor division (Tajik, 1383: 91).

The consequence of accepting the principles mentioned above led to tangible changes in the national role of Iran. This action caused a significant difference in Iran's relations with the Persian Gulf countries and Western Europe. The end of the war pushed the Iranians towards reconstruction because the war destroyed Iran's economy. The aggressive approach that prevailed during this period delayed friendly relations with neighbors and beyond. End of this period, many of Iran's foreign policy necessities had been affected by the war, eliminated. With the end of the conflict and confrontation conditions between countries, there will be changes in countries' attitudes and positions. The end of the war shifted the balance of power between Islam's pragmatic and ideological interests in favor of the former because the terrible consequences of the imposed war taught Iran to use its control in securing its national interests as a nation-state instead of playing the savior of Islamic countries and the Third World (Ehteshami, 1378: 128).

### **3.2. The Priority of Nationalism Over Islamic Internationalism**

According to this view, the priority of national interests over transnational interests in conflict situations is for the time constraints; if multinational responsibilities are before national interests regarding the value principles, but national interests according to time and place take precedence over them. Some belief in this theory. (Dolatabadi, 1375). For example, Sayyed Mohammad Sadr writes: "In the current situation, the Islamic Republic of Iran is the heart of the Islamic world. Therefore, the security of the Islamic Republic of Iran has priority over the security of the Islamic world, not actual superiority, so, maintaining the security of the Islamic Republic of Iran means maintaining the security of the Islamic world". The overhead view, with any justification, indicates the priority of national interests in practice; the subject principle does not matter.

Hojjati Kermani's idea is beyond: "The claim that the Islamic government is transnational is theoretically correct. However, considering the obligation to international treaties and the custom of international law, the global nature of the government and leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran is not the constitution purport, and not compatible with the custom of international law, or claimed by the leader and government of the Islamic Republic of Iran" (Kiani, 1386: 84).

Achieving Islamic ideals and commitment to Muslims and defending their rights in this period, as in the past, maintained its absolute status in foreign policy. Still, the Islamic Republic was obliged to provide and fulfill them as much as its power and ability. In other words, the decision-makers and the foreign policy executors of the Islamic Republic of Iran during these years, recognizing the facts, had concluded that they should consider other governments as representing the interests of their nations. Therefore, paying more attention to the foreign environment and participating in the international ruling system replaced distancing from the global climate during the Iraq-Iran war.

### **3.3. Nationalist Interpretation of Foreign Policy Principles**

#### **3.3.1. The Principle of Issuing a Revolution; Internal Modeling**

At the same time, with the de-escalation process in foreign policy, it was needed to plan new interpretations of some themes and principles of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran; to reduce the mental obstacles and limitations facing foreign policymakers. In addition, the new process created after the adoption of Resolution 598 reduced the external appearance of the revolution. As a result of this process, there was less support for the revolution export. After the war, emphasized the spiritual aspects of the revolution export. In this regard, President Hashemi said: "Issuing a revolution means issuing the revolution thought, not interfering in the affairs of the other; we cannot stop issuing an idea with a soldier, thought is even stronger than a laser". Elsewhere he says: "We do not have anything called the export of revolution. It means that we introduce our revolution to the world, and whoever wants can use our experience. We do not intervene militarily in any country in any way" (Ettelaat, 1381: 3).

Iran's foreign policy during the Rafsanjani era moved away from adventure and became more pragmatic. It has three main pillars of this new thinking. It was accepting the severe limitation of Iran's ability to change in the political arena of the Islamic world, closer to the West, and improving relations with Iran's neighbors (Milani, 1381: 410). Simultaneously, the Islamic Republic of Iran faced three important realities with resolving its foreign policy problems and issues. First, pay attention to the fact that the international system operates based on interdependence. Therefore, Iran cannot change the quo status and take effective action outside the existing international structures. Then, Iran was aware of its profound economic problems in the post-war period. Accordingly, it sought to implement an effective and comprehensive reform of its financial system and administrative apparatus. Finally, Iran should use foreign aid to improve the many economic problems. In this regard, attempt to address the economic difficulties of military weakness and shortcomings in financial investment from a structural perspective. The world king believes: "After the Imam Khomeini death, Iran's foreign policy has become

based on national interests rather than ideological considerations. Iran revised the slogan of "Revolution Issuing" to avoid confrontation with its neighbors; the slogan "Islamic Revolution Issuing" created riots in some Persian Gulf countries, such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Sadri also believes that the fiery orientation, despite claims against the Clinton administration, is the best description for this decade's foreign policy" (Sadri, 1381: 462).

In this regard, Iranian leaders expressed the concept of Iran's regional role as a spreading center of the Islamic Revolution to its neighbors, which has strengthened Iran's political-military structures. As a result, the attention to military and economic infrastructure is of greater priority and importance to Iranian leaders. Therefore, Iran's primary goal is to develop the Islamic Revolution, especially in its neighboring countries. In continuing this, Iran wants to appear as an actor in the region with effective military and political influence and power. Therefore, achieving such a process should be considered the heart and center of gravity of Iran's policies. The new trend that was created after the adoption of Resolution 598 reduced the outward appearance of the revolution and made it somewhat homely. As a result, there was less talk of revolution issuing, but the method and discourse of exporting took on a different form. During this period, some of the early leaders of the revolution said that if we provide political freedom and independence for the people and society, our country will be a sample for others. It will affect all third-world countries and Islamic governments without any problems.

### **3.3.2. A New Interpretation of Independency in Foreign Policy**

The concept of independence is one of the keywords of the leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khamenei, in the field of foreign policy. According to the leader idea, the primary goal of the domination system is the submission and dependence of the Islamic system on the arrogant powers. Thus, according to the cruel world, the Islamic Republic's crime is to adhere to Islam, independence, and the interests of its nation. In our opinion, this issue is the key to the success, power, and survival of the Islamic system in the international arena. Therefore, Iranian people relying on Islam will proudly continue their glorious path in the world (Khamenei, 1373).

The Islamic Republic's emphasis on adopting independent diplomacy, free from dependence on arrogant powers, was not unaffected by Iran's internal developments. A moral understanding of the state duties emphasizing self-confidence, self-reliance, achieving total sovereignty, the realization of independence culture, and the denial of self-destruction and alienation from the West provided belief in the strategy of confronting the hegemonic order of the two imperialist superpowers, striving to establish a just international system and striving to export the culture of revolution. It led to the schooling of foreign policy (Dehshiri, 1380: 374).

The Islamic Republic of Iran is the historical result of the Iranian political struggles to interruption ties and supplying political independence and national sovereignty. According to accepting Islamic Revolution management by clergy, its tendencies were naturally religious and based on Islamic thought (Sari al-Qalam, 1379: 93).

Ehteshami believes that "Independence" and distance from the great powers seems to be more of a sign of honor displayed inside the country (Ehteshami: 164). By showing xenophobia, Sandra McKay believes that Ayatollah Khomeini knew the roots of Iranians in the twentieth century (McKay, 1380: 283).

#### **4. Hashemi Islamism and Foreign Policy**

Hashemi's foreign policy discourse is a sub-discourse in the dominant discourse of Islamism with a jurisprudential-political approach throughout the life of the Islamic Republic. According to the article main emphasis on Hashemi's foreign policy analysis, the essential components of this sub-discourse include:

##### **4.1. New Foreign Policy Architecture Based on the Concept of the Islamic State Expediency**

According to Imam Khomeini, the critical and pivotal factor in any decision is the maintenance of the system. Thus, by granting absolute authority to the jurist, he expands the government's maneuvering power in dealing with the worlds political, economic, cultural, and social problems based on practicality. As a result, it increases the ability to lead Islamic society in different times and places, dealing with modernism. He insists not on the appearances of the Shari'ah but its nature; that is, the practicality is imposed on command. And this argument presumption is the Ummah rationality can discern its interests. Since the ruling is one of the wise and their leader, it is following them, and in other words, it emphasizes the connection between reason and law.

Imam Khomeini, in response to disagreements between the Shura Council and the Guardian Council on legislation and other issues, stated: "The government, which is a branch of the absolute guardianship of the Prophet, is one of the basic rules of Islam and precedes all the sub-rules, even prayer, fasting, and Hajj. Therefore, the government can unilaterally cancel legal contracts with the people when that contract is against the country's interests and Islam. And it can prevent the occurrence of something, whether worship or non-worship, that occurrence is against the interests of Islam. In addition, the government can temporarily stop Hajj, the essential divine duty, if it opposes the country's interests". In the theory of absolute guardianship of the jurisprudent, Imam Khomeini considered the expediency of the Islamic government above the basic rules of Islam. This attitude was the basis for the formation of the Expediency

Council to resolve the dispute between the Shura Council and the Guardian Council. Thus, the Velayat-e-Faqih theory formed a new version, "The Precedence of the Government Expediency and Expediency-oriented Over the Basic Rules of Islam" (Bashirieh, 1381: 9-48). During the construction period, expediency-oriented based on Islamic fundamentalism intensified in the face of domestic issues.

In the foreign policy literature of the Islamic Republic, the content load of pragmatism is considered equivalent to the concepts of expediency-oriented and Islamic realism. Still, pragmatism seems to have a maximum reading of Islamic expediency-oriented or realism. Of course, in this context, Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani uses the concept of Islamic realism. According to him, Islamic realism means that we do not forget Islam. Our ideals are becoming more Islamic and realistic. Also, his moderate personality trait adds to the degree of deepening of Islamic realism in foreign policy. In this regard, Hashemi Rafsanjani acknowledges that "perhaps my first characteristic is moderation, which is in my nature. I reached moderation from my thoughts" (Rahmani, 302).

#### **4.2. Reconciliation of Islamic Ideology and Realities and Its Impact on Foreign Policy**

Revolutionary pragmatists and idealists consider the foundations of the existing international system to be oppressive and illegitimate and believe religion and belief to the highest and first source of political loyalty to the people instead of nationality. However, like the proponents of the Islamic world order, pragmatic revolutionaries have never hidden their commitment to work to establish a world order based on Islamic ideals and consider it their true and ultimate goal (Ramezani, 1381: 62).

While the idealists consider the spiritual and material support of Islamic and liberation movements in different parts of the world the best way to export the revolution, pragmatists insist on going in and providing an exemplary sample of an ideal Islamic society. Proponents of the Islamic world order consider conflict with the current international system inevitable and, in the current situation, seek to establish the outstanding Islamic order in the world. In contrast, the pragmatic attitude recommends peaceful coexistence. It postpones its full and final realization of the future by defending the gradual groundwork for establishing a world order based on Islamic values.

Also, in the eyes of pragmatic revolutionaries, the weight of "Being Iranian" and "Being Islamic" in forming the national identity of Iranian society is relatively balanced. At the same time, idealists place the national and Iranian character in the shadow of the Islamic and religious image (Milani, 1383: 216).

The tendency towards pragmatism was not directed against the "Ideal Vision of the Islamic World Order" but in its continuation.

In this period, the pragmatic narrative of neither Eastern nor Western politics is a new perspective from the view mentioned above, which seeks to reconcile far-sighted unrealistic ideals with contemporary political realities while moderating them (Karsh, 1989: 85).

#### **4.3. Umm al-Qura Theory and Hashemi's Foreign Policy**

Dr. Mohammad Javad Larijani introduces the pillars of Umm al-Qura's theory as follows:

**A)** The Islamic world is a nation composed of people with cohesion, direction, and movement. Velayat is the same. Imam guides the Ummah and is responsible for the whole Ummah;

**B)** The criterion of the Ummah unity is its leadership. Thus, the country will become the Umm al-Qura of the Islamic world, worthy of leading the nation. Therefore, the main criterion is "Velayat," not the strategic position and the like. If a country claims to be an Umm al-Qura, it must increase its geographical boundaries and make choices in its Ummah. A group may be the Umm al-Qura of Islam and then removed from this position;

**C)** After the Islamic Revolution, Iran became the Umm al-Qura, and Imam Khomeini took over two positions: the legal leadership of the Islamic Republic and the province of the Islamic world. According to this theory, conflicting between the requirements of these two honors, the Ummah interests always have priority, except Umm al-Qura that its preservation is obligatory on the entire Ummah;

**D)** In the dialectical connection between the Umm al-Qura and the Islamic world, all nations must defend the Umm al-Qura (Larijani, 1364: 47).

Umm al-Qura and the Islamic Ummah each have rights and duties towards the other. Umm al-Qura 'must protect and support the Ummah and help it and try to prevent the oppression of the powers. And in return has the rights, which is the duty of the Ummah towards the Umm al-Qura. If Umm al-Qura 'is attacked by the enemies and opponents of Umm al-Qura, help Umm al-Qura with all her might and existence. (Larijani, 1369: 47).

#### **4.4. Tolerant Tendencies in Foreign Policy Are Rooted in Islamic Interests**

Tolerant tendencies of the foreign policy behavioral pattern of the Islamic Republic are derived from the characteristics and structure of ideological traditionalism. It is based on the concepts of expediency and necessity in jurisprudential principles and scientific requirements and the establishment and continuation of the Islamic government. Assuming the existence of the national government and resolving the founding conflict with it, expediency and necessity should be considered the essential and practical measures that provide a wide range of possibilities for the tendency to compromise and tolerance (Nowruzi, 1382: 380).

The tolerant tendencies of the foreign policy behavior of the Islamic Republic of Iran are to deviate from some of the components of Islamic political thought that played a crucial role in the theoretical infrastructure of its foreign relations in the early years of the revolution. These components are Jihad, ignoring the national territory of states, and interfering in their affairs. Invasion means basing relations with Islamic and non-Islamic nations instead of the governments that are their legal representatives, Nafy Al-Sabil, or strategic struggle with the world's superpowers. However, in the second decade of the revolution, there has been an objective, customary, and to some extent under the charter and international law principles as normative rules in Iran's foreign relations. It has brought the country closer to a global camp with a universally accepted and regulated geopolitical hierarchy.

### **5. The Impact of Western Identity Ideas on Hashemi's Foreign Policy**

While maintaining the positions of Islamic fundamentalism, Hashemi tried to adopt goals in foreign policy that are based on supplying internal needs; and increase the compatibility of foreign policy goals with the international environment to advance and succeed in foreign policy during the construction period (Yaghubi, 1387: 55).

Hashemi Rafsanjani, with awareness of the international environment, pursued some goals in foreign policy. They are ending Iran's international isolation, normalization of Iran's containment policy by the United States, attracting foreign capital, acquiring modern weapons, and reviving military forces.

#### **5.1. Tendency to Convergence in the International Order**

By adopting UN Security Council Resolution 598, the Islamic Republic of Iran has embraced existing international norms. Despite the belief in unfairness, some international standards, such as the veto in the UN, abandoned its past policy of disregarding these organizations. Iran reached an agreement with major international economic organizations, namely the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and the government of Hashemi Rafsanjani adopted policies of structural adjustment and economic reform to rebuild Iran's economy (Haji Yousefi, 1382: 5).

Convergence and integration in the international order of this period, which officially began with the adoption of Resolution 598, was the beginning of a new era formed by the first generation and group of political leaders after Ayatollah Khomeini. In general, Iranian leaders since 1989 have emphasized constructive diplomacy. However, during this period, the modern orientation of Iran's foreign policy had similar components to the previous period. Although it had established an exceptionally peaceful way to repair Iran's foreign policy since the second half of the 1370s, its emergence as a



convergence strategy had not materialized. The new trend was based on peaceful coexistence and economic cooperation with the developed countries of capitalism. But for the fulfillment of this process, they need new opportunities and conditions for Hashemi Rafsanjani to play the role of president and Ayatollah Khamenei's position of the Supreme Leader. Together, they changed and reformed foreign policy that affected other social and political life aspects and the new leadership. The focus of the policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran in this period was to restore stability in the Persian Gulf region.

Consequently, establishing more robust relations with the global capitalist system was one of the priorities of Iran's new trend. On the other hand, the Islamic Republic of Iran sought to rebuild its relations with international and regional organizations. In following Iran's tendency in the Hashemi period, examine the convergence with the Western system of the global system as an example:

#### **5.1.1. Connection with International Financial Institutions**

Hashemi's plan for the post-war period was implemented by encouraging foreign investors to invest in Iran and borrow from world banks. He had four specific goals: ending Iran's political isolation, changing America's view of Iran, attracting foreign investment to Iran, and acquiring modern military weapons. Thus, we can investigate Iran's practical and behavioral strategy in foreign policy in the form of normalization.

The first and second development programs from 1368 to 1376 had economic growth as their primary goal. Therefore, these programs included a set of economic policies, such as privatization, encouraging foreign investment, developing and modernizing the stock market, and creating free trade zones. In connection with such policies, the Iranian government sought to play a more favorable role in international economics. To this end, strengthening relations with the global capitalist system was a priority in its foreign policy process. Hence, it established strong links with international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In addition, Iran increased its stake to influence the IMF's decision-making process. Iran's cooperation with organizations was appropriate until 1371. Still, since Bill Clinton implemented a policy of bilateral containment against Iran and Iraq, Iran's relations with international financial organizations have entered a phase of conflict and struggle. The majority of Iran's loan applications to the World Bank were disrupted by US domination. At the same time, the technical, expert, and research cooperation benefited from the World Bank's experience and the IMF's recommendations. In addition, in 1374, Iran applied for membership in the GATT, which had become a WTO. Mr. Kalantari, the Minister of Agriculture, emphasized Iran's membership in the World Trade Organization because, in his opinion, Iran could not live apart from the world community and ignore global developments in

the agricultural and industrial sectors. Instead, they should become a member of the World Trade Organization as soon as possible to gain a fair and worthy share of the world market (Azghandi, 1381: 105).

#### **5.1.2. Adherence to Western International Norms and Rules**

The main characteristics of the tendency to accept and adhere to Western international norms and rules in Hashemi's foreign policy are:

- Emphasis on peaceful coexistence and avoiding of hostile and conflicting actions against the existing global system, despite fundamental dissatisfaction and criticism of its principles;
- Accepting the role of the United Nations in Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and adhering to Security Council resolutions in this regard;
- Emphasizing the role of international organizations and world forums and encouraging third world countries to use these levers to defend their interests;
- Willingness attracts foreign and international interests, facilities, and investments to participate in domestic economic activities and industrial projects.

#### **5.2. Anti-Western Adjustment**

After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1368 and Rafsanjani's positive role in the release of American and other Western hostages in Lebanon, there were signs of improved relations. In addition, the United States appreciated Iran's position in the Gulf War, and US President Bush said: "It brings goodwill, goodwill". But this situation did not last long. Both side's leaders were severely criticized internally for their reconciliation policy. In October 1992, shortly before stepping down, Bush passed a law to prevent Iran-Iraq nuclear proliferation, including pre-imposed sanctions on Iraq.

In relating with the region's countries, Iran limited itself to government-government relations, and in practice, pursued a "Secular" foreign policy and avoided any action that could be considered interventionist. Instead, the country followed the establishment and maintenance of peace and stability for economic and political reasons.

This policy also manifested itself in Iran's relations with many other countries. Thus, Iran sought to normalize its relations with all other countries, including the West, which required avoiding critical and propaganda actions against these countries, limiting oneself to government-government ties, and, in practice, abandoning any plan to export the revolution. Iran also pursued a policy of non-confrontation with foreign countries as long as the other side had the same approach. Thus, militant policies continued only in countries that followed hostile policies toward Iran and countries whose relations with Iran were unimportant.

#### **5.3. Acceptance of the Theoretical Model with Western Nature in the Field of Economics**

Economic adjustment policy was the base of many countries since the late 1980s, including the former socialist countries (Eastern Bloc) and the Third World. In addition, international financial institutions such as the World Bank also recommended and supported the implementation of this policy to create more coordination in the global economy. Thus, the turn in the economic policies of the Islamic Republic coincided with similar turns in other parts of the world. But the successful advancement of this policy, like any different model, required its preconditions and requirements. The most important of these preconditions are as follows:

- The relative consensus within the government and major political institutions on the economic liberalization program;
- Regulating a clear, coordinated, and workable plan for the implementation of the economic liberalization program;
- Relatively favorable social contexts, and in particular the lack of organized solid forces opposed to the program.

In such circumstances, extended the pursuit of some ideological and political goals and tendencies in the country's foreign policy beyond the borders. Thus, while Iran's international position was still fragile, such activities exacerbated the situation and fueled international accusations against Iran. In addition, the continuation of revolutionary ideological policy in the Middle East and opposition to Western plans to resolve the Palestinian crisis intensified international pressure on Iran; especially by the United States, and in 1995 led to the intensification of economic sanctions on Iran (in the form of the Damato-Kennedy plan). These sanctions severely restricted foreign investment, in which conditions were necessary to advance economic reforms (Delavari, 1385: 7-164).

### **Conclusion**

The scientific community still considers foreign policy analysis focusing on international relations theory despite the decline of government involvement in the post-Ostafalia era. The present study aimed to use constructivism theory to study Hashemi's foreign policy.

In 1989, changed the identity components of Iranian society regarding the national and international developments. Factors caused significant changes in the identity of Iranian society: ending the imposed war in 1989 and the beginning of the construction period, the weakening of the spiritual components and the emphasis on the material elements, and the coming to power of the technocratic class in Iran, the collapse of the Soviet-led semantic-identity discourse in the 1370s and the dominance of the Western-led liberal-democratic identity discourse, especially the United States. These changes led to a new interpretation of Iran's foreign policy behavior. As a result, Iran's behavior changed from a revolutionary, aggressive, rigid, and

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revisionist state in the international system to a corrective, defensive, flexible, and supportive behavior. In other words, the constructive government's attempt in the foreign arena was changing Iran to become a regular player in the international system over time.

During this period, the interpretation of revolutionary Islam shifted to expedient Islam, which strengthened pragmatic foreign policy and distanced it from ideological foreign policy. The revival of nationalist elements, the strengthening of the middle class, and the rise of technocrats also strengthened this. The Soviet-led socialist-communist collapse identity discourse and the dominance of the US-led liberal-democratic discourse and the overlap with the above developments strengthened the reasonable discourse in Iranian foreign policy.

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