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لطفیان, سعیده. (1404). تهدیدهای هسته‌ای در جنگ اوکراین و تأثیر افکار عمومی روسیه بر سیاست بازدارندگی هسته‌ای کرملین. , 18(1), 303-334. doi: 10.22059/jcep.2025.390640.450305
سعیده لطفیان. "تهدیدهای هسته‌ای در جنگ اوکراین و تأثیر افکار عمومی روسیه بر سیاست بازدارندگی هسته‌ای کرملین". , 18, 1, 1404, 303-334. doi: 10.22059/jcep.2025.390640.450305
لطفیان, سعیده. (1404). 'تهدیدهای هسته‌ای در جنگ اوکراین و تأثیر افکار عمومی روسیه بر سیاست بازدارندگی هسته‌ای کرملین', , 18(1), pp. 303-334. doi: 10.22059/jcep.2025.390640.450305
لطفیان, سعیده. تهدیدهای هسته‌ای در جنگ اوکراین و تأثیر افکار عمومی روسیه بر سیاست بازدارندگی هسته‌ای کرملین. , 1404; 18(1): 303-334. doi: 10.22059/jcep.2025.390640.450305

تهدیدهای هسته‌ای در جنگ اوکراین و تأثیر افکار عمومی روسیه بر سیاست بازدارندگی هسته‌ای کرملین

مطالعات اوراسیای مرکزی
دوره 18، شماره 1 - شماره پیاپی 35، شهریور 1404، صفحه 303-334    اصل مقاله (1.23 M)
نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی
شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22059/jcep.2025.390640.450305
نویسنده
سعیده لطفیان*
استاد، گروه علوم سیاسی، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران
چکیده
جنگ اوکراین سبب شد که روسیه بر توانایی نظامی هسته‌ای خود بیشتر تأکید کند و به تهدیدهای هسته‌ای به‌منظور اثرگذاری بر افکار عمومی، بازدارندگی مداخله مستقیم ناتو و به تسلیم واداشتن اوکراین ادامه دهد. فشار افکار عمومی چالشی برای همه دولت‌ها در یافتن راهکارهایی برای جلب حمایت شهروندان از سیاست‌های بحث‌برانگیزشان به‌شمار می‌آید. پرسش‌ اصلی پژوهش عبارتست از: چگونه روابط ستیزه‌جویانه و پرتنش روسیه و ناتو بر دیدگاه مردم روسیه در مورد کاربرد نظامی جنگ‌افزارهای هسته‌ای تأثیر داشته است و به دگرگونی سیاست هسته‌ای کرملین کمک کرده است؟ در فرضیه پژوهش استدلال می‌شود که افزایش رویارویی تنش‌زا در روابط قدرت‌های بزرگ پس از جنگ اوکراین و سست‌ شدن حرام‌انگاری (تابوی) هسته‌ای در افکار عمومی روسیه به تأکید بیشتر بر تهدید کاربرد سلاح‌های هسته‌ای در سیاست‌ بازدارندگی هسته‌ای دولت پوتین منجر شده است. از رویکردی کیفی در چارچوب نظریه‌های بازدارندگی و افکار عمومی، برای تحلیل و تبیین مضمون کلی سخنان تحریک‌آمیز مقام­های روسی و یافته‌های نمونه‌هایی از نظرسنجی‌های عمومی در مورد مسائل هسته‌ای در روسیه و امریکا برای پاسخ‌دهی به پرسش‌‌های پژوهشی و درک پیامدهای تهدیدهای هسته‌ای روسیه استفاده می‌شود. سرانجام، پیشنهادهای سیاستی پژوهشگران و نخبگان علمی برای مدیریت بحران و کاهش احتمال به واقعیت پیوستن تهدید کرملین به کاربرد جنگ‌افزارهای هسته‌ای تاکتیکی در صحنه نبرد اوکراین ارائه خواهد شد.
کلیدواژه‌ها
فکار عمومی؛ تهدید هسته‌ای؛ راهبرد «اوج‌گیری برای فروکش تنش»؛ روسیه؛ اوکراین
عنوان مقاله [English]
Nuclear Threats in the Ukraine War, and the Impact of Russian Public Opinion on the Kremlin's Nuclear Deterrence Policy
نویسندگان [English]
Saideh Lotfian
Professor, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran
چکیده [English]
Introduction: Since the onset of the war between Russia and Ukraine, Kremlin has blatantly endeavored to draw attention to Russian nuclear weapons capabilities with the goals of deterring or minimizing NATO’s intervention and compelling Ukrainian leaders to surrender. At the same time, Putin’s government has shown its intolerance of opposition to its war policies, set out to manipulate public opinion to change Russian citizens’ views of the costly war, and prevent dissent. Some theorists view public opinion as closely linked to regime type and the nature of security environment at national, regional and international levels. Public opinion is a challenge for all governments in finding solutions to increase the citizens’ support for their unpopular or controversial policies. The two main objectives of the author are as follows: a) to present a selection of competing arguments about the credibility and implication of Russia’s nuclear threats, and b) to examine recent public opinion surveys and public debates concerning a wide range of nuclear security issues, particularly the use of nuclear weapons in wars, and nuclear disarmament.
Research questions: An attempt is made to find answers to the following questions: 1. What do the Russian citizens and elites think about the use of nuclear weapons in war? 2. What are the differences and similarities in attitudes of the citizens in Russia and the U.S. towards nuclear weapons? 3. Has the war in Ukraine changed Russian public opinion towards the non-use of nuclear weapons? 4. Has the war led to a more uncompromising elites’ attitudes towards Russia-NATO nuclear confrontation? 5. What are the policy recommendations to mitigate the risks of nuclear escalation and to reduce the value of nuclear weapons in the current intransigent foreign and defense policies of Russia and other nuclear weapons states?
Research hypothesis: In the research hypothesis, it is postulated that the rising great power tension and the weakening of the nuclear taboo against the use of nuclear weapons, particularly among Russian citizens and elites have resulted in a greater focus on nuclear weapons in the Kremlin’s nuclear deterrence policy.
Methodology and theoretical framework: After a review of political science literature analyzing the link between nuclear deterrence and security, the author uses a qualitative approach to analyze and explain general themes in certain provocative statements made by Russian authorities and summarize the key findings of the most recent public opinion surveys on nuclear issues in Russia and the United States in order to answer the preceding questions and test the research hypothesis. Additional objectives are: a) Understanding the relevance of the ethical aspects of nuclear taboo for the ordinary citizens and political and academic elites in Russia; 2) Assessing the likelihood of the war in Ukraine escalating in a nuclear war between Russia and NATO; c) Discussing mitigating measures to de-escalate the Russo-Ukrainian military confrontation, and nuclear risk reductions.
Results and discussion: It is difficult to measure how public opinion on the nuclear issues change the foreign policy behaviors of the major actors engaged in the Russia-Ukraine military confrontation. Nuclear weapons have not been used in the battlefield since 1945, in spite of the precedent set by the U.S. nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Nevertheless, the nuclear-armed states have shown little interest in focusing on efforts aimed at nuclear disarmament, based on their obligation under Article VI of the NPT. In fact, they have been engaged in a renewed arms race to modernize their nuclear arsenals with the purpose of enhancing their nuclear war-fighting capabilities. Russia and the other nuclear weapons states did not sign the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Since the deterioration of the relations between Russia and NATO over the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has resorted to nuclear threats and placed greater emphasis on nuclear weapons in its foreign policies. The involvement of the top nuclear weapons states (Russia, US, UK, France, China) in multilateral arms control negotiations would help the reduction of the risks of a nuclear world war. Remarkably, the results provide some support for the argument that nuclear taboo has been weakened in the wake of the repeated use of Russian unequivocal nuclear threats and nuclear signaling, but most of the people are still in favor of the non-use of nuclear weapons in wars and nuclear non-proliferation.
Conclusion: Since the US did not remove its nuclear weapons from Europe, Kremlin deployed its tactical nuclear weapons in the territory of Belarus as a political tit-for-tat. All the nuclear weapons states are stubbornly retaining possession of their nuclear arsenals, which they view as an integral part of their national security strategy with no regard to their NPT commitment to work toward nuclear disarmament. There is ample evidence that the great power competition will encourage the nuclear rivals (i.e., China, Russian, the U.S.) to move toward a new nuclear arms race with devastating economic and political repercussions for their citizens and the rest of the world. Yet, the pressure of public opinion is a challenge for all governments in finding ways to win public support for their controversial policies including those for nuclear buildup. Accordingly, public awareness campaigns should be strengthened to increase public pressures on politicians for nuclear arms control and disarmament.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
Public Opinion, Nuclear Threat, “Escalate to De-Escalate” Strategy, Russia, Ukraine
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