Regulation and Audit Fees for Initial Audit Engagements | ||
| Interdisciplinary Journal of Management Studies | ||
| دوره 19، شماره 3، پاییز 2026، صفحه 497-525 اصل مقاله (1.58 M) | ||
| نوع مقاله: Research Paper | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22059/ijms.2025.380306.676927 | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| Fakhroddin Mohammad Rezaei* 1؛ Ehsan Dolatzarei2؛ Omid Faraji3؛ Zabihollah Rezaee4 | ||
| 1Faculty of Finance, Kharazmi University, Tehran, Iran | ||
| 2Department of Accounting, Faculty of Management, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran | ||
| 3Department of Accounting, Faculty of Management and Accounting, University of Tehran, College of Frabi, Qom, Iran | ||
| 4Crews School of Accountancy, the University of Memphis, TN, USA | ||
| چکیده | ||
| This study examines whether the audit firm ranking (AFR) mandated by the Securities and Exchange Organization (SEO) in Iran in 2013 is associated with audit fees for initial audit engagements. We propose that such regulation, in a highly competitive and compliance-driven market, could differently impact the bargaining power of auditors. Our findings indicate that audit fee discounts in initial engagements have decreased in the post-AFR era. Additionally, in line with the bargaining power perspective, audit fee discounts are greater when switching to non-Top auditors compared to Top auditors (first-ranked Trusted Audit Firms by SEO), when switching within non-Top auditors as opposed to Top auditors, and when switching from Top to non-Top auditors rather than from non-Top to Top auditors. The results are robust across several sensitivity tests and offer policy, practice, and research implications by exploring audit fee discounts in initial engagements arising from regulatory initiatives. | ||
| کلیدواژهها | ||
| Audit fee discounts؛ initial audit engagements؛ audit regulation؛ bargaining power | ||
| مراجع | ||
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آمار تعداد مشاهده مقاله: 542 تعداد دریافت فایل اصل مقاله: 476 |
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