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Hajimoladarvish, Narges. (1396). The Attitudes of Iranians toward the Becker Proposition. , 22(1), 105-120. doi: 10.22059/ier.2018.65353
Narges Hajimoladarvish. "The Attitudes of Iranians toward the Becker Proposition". , 22, 1, 1396, 105-120. doi: 10.22059/ier.2018.65353
Hajimoladarvish, Narges. (1396). 'The Attitudes of Iranians toward the Becker Proposition', , 22(1), pp. 105-120. doi: 10.22059/ier.2018.65353
Hajimoladarvish, Narges. The Attitudes of Iranians toward the Becker Proposition. , 1396; 22(1): 105-120. doi: 10.22059/ier.2018.65353

The Attitudes of Iranians toward the Becker Proposition

Iranian Economic Review
مقاله 5، دوره 22، شماره 1، خرداد 2018، صفحه 105-120    اصل مقاله (643.01 K)
شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22059/ier.2018.65353
نویسنده
Narges Hajimoladarvish*
Faculty of Social Sciences and Economics, Alzahra University, Tehran, Iran
چکیده
This paper evaluates attitudes of Iranians toward crossing red traffic lights and their sensitivity to fines. Economic theory of crime under expected utility predicts that because of the possibility of severe punishments, risk adverse individuals would not cross red lights. This is implied by the Becker proposition. However, among 262 individuals surveyed, more than half of the sample has previous records of conviction with respect to traffic laws. The result indicates that the effect of introducing a new fine on pedestrians is about twice the effect of increasing the existing fine on drivers by 150%. The elasticity of crossing red lights with respect to fine hike is -0.25. Regression analysis shows that previous record of breaking traffic laws, being single and crossing red lights by cars are significant explanatory variables for decision to do jaywalking.
کلیدواژه‌ها
Keywords: Becker Proposition؛ Crossing Red Traffic Lights؛ Jaywalking؛ Expected Utility. JEL Classification: D81؛ K42
مراجع
Dhami, S., & Al-Nowaihi, A. (2006). Hang ’Em With Probability Zero: Why Does It Network? University of Leicester Working Papers, Retrieved from

http://www.le.ac.uk/economics/research/RePEc/lec/leecon/dp06-14.pdf. 

 

Dhami, S., & Al-Nowaihi, A. (2013). An Extension of the Becker Proposition to Non-Expected Utility Theory. Mathematical Social Sciences, 65(1), 10–20.

 

Bar Ilan, A., & Sacerdote, B. (2004). The Response of Criminals and Noncriminals to Fines. Journal of Law and Economics, 47, 1–17.

 

Becker, G. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76, 169–217.

 

Cameron, A. C., & Trivedi, P. K. (2010). Micro-econometrics Using Stata (2nd Ed.). Texas: Stata Press.

 

Conover, W. J. (1999). Practical Nonparametric Statistics (3rd Ed.). Michigan: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

 Glenny, M. (2008). McMafia: A Journey through the Global Criminal Underworld. New York: Vintage Books.

 

Lea, S. E. G. (2006). How to Do as Well as You Can: The Psychology of Economic Behavior and Behavioral Ecology, in Altman, M. (Ed.). Handbook of Contemporary Behavioral Economics Foundations and Developments. New York: Armonk.

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