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مداخله دولت در رقابت بین زنجیرههای تأمین سبز و غیرسبز | ||
| مدیریت صنعتی | ||
| مقاله 7، دوره 10، شماره 2، 1397، صفحه 297-314 اصل مقاله (475.09 K) | ||
| نوع مقاله: مقاله علمی پژوهشی | ||
| شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22059/imj.2018.262181.1007464 | ||
| نویسندگان | ||
| مریم اسمعیلی* 1؛ شهلا زندی2 | ||
| 1دانشیار مهندسی صنایع، دانشکده مهندسی صنایع، دانشگاه الزهرا، تهران، ایران | ||
| 2دانشجوی دکتری مهندسی صنایع، دانشکده مهندسی صنایع دانشگاه الزهرا، تهران، ایران | ||
| چکیده | ||
| هدف: محیط زیست و مسائل مربوط به آن، از جمله مباحث بهروز و دغدغههای امروزه سیاستگذاران، سازمانها، کسبوکارها و حتی مردم عادی است. مدیران اغلب کسبوکارها به دلایل گوناگونی از جمله فشارهای دولتی، خواستههای مردمی، افزایش سهم بازار خود و ...، در زنجیرههای تأمین خود مسائل زیستمحیطی را در نظر میگیرند. در این مقاله دو نوع زنجیره تأمین سبز و غیرسبز سه سطحی شامل تأمینکننده، تولیدکننده و خردهفروش با توجه به مداخله دولت در مقدار و قیمت محصولات سبز و غیر سبز بررسی شده است. روش: در این پژوهش، نقش دولت بهمنزله رهبر، برای رسیدن به کاهش هزینههای اقتصادی و زیستمحیطی و افزایش شاخص رفاه اجتماعی با تعیین تعرفههایی برای هر دو زنجیره بر اساس بازی استکلبرگ، بهشکل مدل برنامهریزی غیرخطی با محدودیتهای چهارسطحی ارائه میشود؛ بهطوریکه ابتدا تعرفهها (برای زنجیرههای تأمین محصول سبز بهصورت پرداخت یارانه و برای محصول غیرسبز بهصورت دریافت جریمه) از سوی دولت تعیین شده؛ سپس بر اساس تعرفهها، مقدار و قیمت محصولات توسط خردهفروش، تأمینکننده و تولیدکننده مشخص میشود. یافتهها: برای تشریح مدل، مثالهای عددی آورده شده است و تحلیل حساسیت روی میزان اهمیت دولت به هر یک از اهداف خود (کاهش هزینههای اقتصادی و زیستمحیطی و افزایش شاخص رفاه اجتماعی) و تأثیر آن بر سود حاصل و تعرفههای وضع شده برای زنجیرههای تأمین بررسی شده است. نتیجهگیری: نتایج نشان میدهد که سود اعضای زنجیره تأمین بهطور چشمگیری وابسته به تعرفه اعمال شده توسط دولت است. همچنین بهترین توازن بین کاهش هزینههای اقتصادی و محیطی و افزایش رفاه مشتریان، هنگامی بهدست میآید که دولت برای همه آنها اهمیت یکسانی قائل شود؛ به این معنا که تا حد ممکن میتواند هر سه هدف خود را برآورده سازد. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها | ||
| قیمتگذاری؛ زنجیره تأمین سبز؛ مداخله دولت؛ نظریه بازی؛ تعرفه | ||
| عنوان مقاله [English] | ||
| Intervention of Government in the Competition between Green and Non-Green Supply Chains | ||
| نویسندگان [English] | ||
| Maryam Esmaeili1؛ shahla zandi2 | ||
| 1Associate Prof., Faculty of Industrial Engineering, Alzahra University, Tehran, Iran | ||
| 2Ph.D. Student in Industrial Engineering, Faculty of Industrial Engineering, Alzahra University, Tehran, Iran | ||
| چکیده [English] | ||
| Objective: The environment and the related issues are among the most up-to-date topics and concerns of policymakers, businesses and even ordinary people. Managers often look for environmental issues in the supply chain of their businesses for a variety of reasons, including governmental pressures, peoples’ demands, increasing their market share and etc. In this paper, two types of three-tier green and non-green supply chain including suppliers, manufacturers and retailers are considered with regard to the government intervention in the amount and price of green and non-green products. Methods: In this research, the role of government as a leader is examined in the form of a nonlinear programming model considering four-level constraints to reduce the economic and environmental costs and increase the social welfare index by setting tariffs for both chains based on Stackelberg game. It is conducted in a fashion that, at first, the tariffs are set by the government (supply chains with green products will receive subsides otherwise they will be fined), and then the price and quantity of the products are determined by the retailer, manufacturer and supplier according to those tariffs. Results: Finally, numerical examples are presented to illustrate the model and the sensitivity analysis of the importance of the role of the government for each of its goals and its impact on profits and tariffs imposed on supply chain has been examined. Conclusion: The results showed that the profits of the supply chain members are significantly dependent on tariffs set by the government. The best balance between reducing economic and environmental costs and increasing the welfare of customers is obtained when the government attaches the same importance to all of them; this means that it can meet all three goals alike as much as possible. | ||
| کلیدواژه‌ها [English] | ||
| pricing, Green supply chain, Government intervention, Game theory, Tariff | ||
| مراجع | ||
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سینایی، محمدرضا؛ راستی برزکی، مرتضی (1397). سیاستهای قیمت گذاری و سبز بودن در زنجیره تأمین محصولات سبز و غیر سبز با مداخله دولت: رویکرد نظریه بازی. نشریه مهندسی صنایع و مدیریت. DOI: 10.24200/J65.2018.20083 علامه، غزاله؛ اسمعیلی، مریم؛ تجویدی، ترانه (1393). توسعه چندین مدل قیمتگذاری در زنجیره تأمین سبز تحت ریسک با رویکرد نظریه بازیها. فصلنامه مدیریت صنعتی، 6(4)،767-789.
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