The Highest Level of Clearness in Pierce’s Pragmatism | ||
| فلسفه | ||
| Article 2, Volume 16, Issue 2 - Serial Number 32, March 2019, Pages 23-41 PDF (1.08 M) | ||
| Document Type: Scientific-research | ||
| DOI: 10.22059/jop.2019.71544 | ||
| Author | ||
| Atieh Zandieh* | ||
| Shahid Motahhari University | ||
| Abstract | ||
| The ‘pragmatic maxim’ is basis of Pierce’s pragmatism. To form this maxim, Pierce was influenced by Descartes’s and Kant’s ideas – especially Descartes’s term of ‘clearness’ and Kant’s interpretation of “Pragma”. At first step, Pierce defined clearness from Descartes’s and Leibniz’s points of view; however, he found these points of view insufficient and criticized them. After that, he presented his own pragmatic maxim and introduced this maxim as the highest level of clearness. In order to give a name to this maxim, Pierce selected the term of ‘Pragma’ (instead of ‘practice’), because - based on Kant’s view - ‘experience’ absolutely interferes in the meaning of pragma. The pragmatic maxim, is a logical maxim that was outlined in Pierce’s ‘research theory’ and it is focused on a sensible practical effect created after every theory. In research theory, Pierce discussed ‘opinion’ as it makes the human ready to act. According to Pierce’s discussion, the task of human’s thought is ‘to create habit’, and the identity of habit is ‘to direct into action’. As a result, Pierce made a connection between opinion, action, habit, and sensible and practical effects of opinion. The Pragmatic maxim is also a semantic maxim and its main functions are clearing the metaphysics’ dilemmas and clarifying that some of its terms are meaningless. | ||
| Keywords | ||
| Key words: Pragmatic Maxim; Clearness; Pragmatism; Pierce; Semantic; Descartes; leibniz | ||
| References | ||
|
دکارت، رنه (1385)، تأملات در فلسفة اولی، ترجمة احمد احمدی، تهران: سمت. ______ (1376)، فلسفة دکارت، ترجمة منوچهر صانعی دره بیدی، تهران: الهدی. کوکب، سعیده و عطیه زندیه (1396)، «شیوة دیالکتیکی سقراط در مواجهه با تعریف دینداری و تأثیر آن بر تثبیت عقیدة پیرس»، فلسفه، ش.1، سال45، بهار و تابستان، 55-74. Buchler, Justus (1955), Philosophical Writing of Peirce, New York: Routledge and keganpaul Ltd, Dover.
Hartshorne, Charls, P. Weiss, and A. Burks eds. (1931), Collected Papers of Charls Sanders Peirce, 8 vols, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard university Press.
Kant, Immanuel (1983), Critique of Pure Reason, Norman Kemp Smith, London: Macmillan press Ltd, Printed in Hong Kong.
Peirce, Charles S. (1877) “The Fixation of Belief”, in Wiener, Philip P. (1958), Charles s. Peirce: Selected Writings, New York: Dover, pp. 91-113.
_________ (1878) “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” in Wiener, Philip P., (1958), Charles s. Peirce: Selected Writings, New York: Dover, pp.113-137.
_________ (1903-1911) “Letters to Lady Welby”, in Wiener, Philip P., (1958), Charles s. Peirce: Selected Writings, New York: Dover, pp.380-432.
_________ (1905) “What Pragmatism Is”, in Wiener, Philip P., (1958), Charles s. Peirce: Selected Writings, New York: Dover, pp.180-203.
_________ (1908) “A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God” in Wiener, Philip P., (1958), Charles s. Peirce: Selected Writings, New York: Dover, pp.358-379. | ||
|
Statistics Article View: 884 PDF Download: 991 |
||