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Gharakhani, S., Amiri, H., Saffari, B. (2022). Agent-Based Modeling of Common-Pool Resource Management through the Emergence of Self-Governing Institutions. , 57(3), 533-561. doi: 10.22059/jte.2023.348357.1008717
Sasan Gharakhani; Hadi Amiri; Babak Saffari. "Agent-Based Modeling of Common-Pool Resource Management through the Emergence of Self-Governing Institutions". , 57, 3, 2022, 533-561. doi: 10.22059/jte.2023.348357.1008717
Gharakhani, S., Amiri, H., Saffari, B. (2022). 'Agent-Based Modeling of Common-Pool Resource Management through the Emergence of Self-Governing Institutions', , 57(3), pp. 533-561. doi: 10.22059/jte.2023.348357.1008717
Gharakhani, S., Amiri, H., Saffari, B. Agent-Based Modeling of Common-Pool Resource Management through the Emergence of Self-Governing Institutions. , 2022; 57(3): 533-561. doi: 10.22059/jte.2023.348357.1008717

Agent-Based Modeling of Common-Pool Resource Management through the Emergence of Self-Governing Institutions

فصلنامه تحقیقات اقتصادی
Volume 57, Issue 3 - Serial Number 140, October 2022, Pages 533-561    PDF (1.17 M)
Document Type: Research Paper
DOI: 10.22059/jte.2023.348357.1008717
Authors
Sasan Gharakhani1; Hadi Amiri* 2; Babak Saffari2
1Department of Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran
2Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics, University of Isfahan, Isfahan, Iran
Abstract
The tragedy of commons is always an inevitable phenomenon in common-pool resources exposed to residents' selfish perceptions. Many researchers of empirical studies believe that self-governing institutions that emerge within a society can solve the tragedy of the commons, but what still needs to be added in guiding this choice is a clearer picture of the mechanisms behind the institutional emergence in the successful management of common-pool resources. Agent-based models provide a suitable tool for this task due to their extraordinary capacity to connect micro and macro levels. This The presents study seeks to develop a simple abstract model of the institutional emergence pattern by introducing the possibility of cheat and enforcement, which has been observed in renewable common-pool resource issues. This article study uses the ADICO institutional grammar as a basic structure to model the institutional rules and define the users' strategies. Users modify their behavior through a transformational process and establish a management institution to manage common-pool resources, eventually leading to many advantages for users and common-pool resources. The results show that even within this simplified model, the self-governing institutions maintain the resource balance at a stable level and improve the average income of the users compared to the open access in all social networks.
JEL Classification:  C63, Q25, P28, O17
Keywords
ADICO Institutional Grammar; Agent-Based Modeling; Common-Pool Resource Management; Institutional Emergence; Social Networks; Tragedy of The Commons
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