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شیروی, عبدالحسین, یوسف زاده, صمد. (1399). تحلیل عملکرد مدیران شرکت در عرصۀ اقدام به تصاحب شرکت دیگر. , 50(1), 97-115. doi: 10.22059/jlq.2020.253913.1007014
عبدالحسین شیروی; صمد یوسف زاده. "تحلیل عملکرد مدیران شرکت در عرصۀ اقدام به تصاحب شرکت دیگر". , 50, 1, 1399, 97-115. doi: 10.22059/jlq.2020.253913.1007014
شیروی, عبدالحسین, یوسف زاده, صمد. (1399). 'تحلیل عملکرد مدیران شرکت در عرصۀ اقدام به تصاحب شرکت دیگر', , 50(1), pp. 97-115. doi: 10.22059/jlq.2020.253913.1007014
شیروی, عبدالحسین, یوسف زاده, صمد. تحلیل عملکرد مدیران شرکت در عرصۀ اقدام به تصاحب شرکت دیگر. , 1399; 50(1): 97-115. doi: 10.22059/jlq.2020.253913.1007014

تحلیل عملکرد مدیران شرکت در عرصۀ اقدام به تصاحب شرکت دیگر

مطالعات حقوق خصوصی
مقاله 7، دوره 50، شماره 1، فروردین 1399، صفحه 97-115    اصل مقاله (282.34 K)
نوع مقاله: مقاله پژوهشی
شناسه دیجیتال (DOI): 10.22059/jlq.2020.253913.1007014
نویسندگان
عبدالحسین شیروی* 1؛ صمد یوسف زاده2
1استاد گروه حقوق خصوصی دانشکدة حقوق و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه تهران (پردیس فارابی)
2دکتری حقوق خصوصی دانشگاه تهران (پردیس بین المللی کیش)
چکیده
تصاحب عبارت است از به چنگ آوردن کنترل مدیریتی شرکت‌های دیگر، از طریق خرید اکثریت سهام دارای حق رأی در انتخاب مدیران، به‌منظور حذف مدیریت ناکارامد. ایجاد ارزش و ازدیاد ثروت سهامداران، به‌عنوان دو هدف اقتصادی مهم، هدف  از تصاحب شرکت دیگر است. با وجود این باید دانست که آیا در عمل، با لحاظ انگیزه‌های مدیران در اقدام به تصاحب، این استراتژی به ایجاد ارزش و ازدیاد ثروت سهامدان شرکت تصاحب‌کننده منجر می‌شود؟ فرضیۀ مطرح‌شده در این تحقیق، پاسخ منفی به پرسش مذکور، با ذکر دلایل اثباتی آن و لزوم حمایت از سهامداران شرکت‌های تصاحب‌کننده است.
کلیدواژه‌ها
انگیزۀ تصاحب؛ تصاحب؛ تصاحب دوستانه؛ تصاحب خصمانه؛ سهام؛ سهامداران؛ شرکت تصاحب‌کننده؛ شرکت هدف؛ مدیران
عنوان مقاله [English]
THE PERFORMANCE OF COMPANY EXECUTIVES IN TAKING OVER A POSITION IN ANOTHER COMPANY
نویسندگان [English]
Abdolhossein Shiravi1؛ Samad Yousefzadeh2
1Professor of Law, Department of Private Law, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, University of Tehran (Farabi Campus), Iran
2PhD in Private Law, University of Tehran Kish International Campus, Iran
چکیده [English]
The acquisition is to take the control of management in other companies by purchasing the majority of voting stocks, in order to eliminate the inefficient management. Creating value and expanding shareholders wealth, as two important economic goals, are the main goal for taking over another company. Nevertheless, it should be understood whether, in practice, the incentives of managers to acquire with applying this strategy, will lead to the creation of value and the increase in the wealth of the company's shareholders? The hypothesis in this research is a negative answer to the above question, explaining the reasons and the need to support the shareholders in the acquiring companies.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
Acquisition, Friendly Acquisition, Hostile Acquisition, Acquisition Motivation, Acquirer, Target Company
مراجع

1. تفرشی،  محمد عیسی (1378)، مباحث تحلیلی از حقوق شرکت‌های تجاری، ج 1، چ اول، تهران: انتشارات دانشگاه تربیت مدرس.

2. عارفی، علی‌اصغر (1388)، «بررسی عملکرد مالی تصاحب شرکت‌ها در ایران»، فصلنامۀ پژوهشنامۀ بازرگانی، ش ۵ ، ص 245-225.

 

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